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Abstract
This commentary provides an overview of the idea of resilience, and acknowledges the challenges of defining and applying
the idea in practice. The article summarizes a way of looking at resilience called a “resilience delta”, that takes into account
both the shock done to a community by a disaster and the capacity of that community to rebound from that shock to
return to its prior functionality. I show how different features of the community can create resilience, and consider how
the developed and developing world addresses resilience. I also consider the role of focusing events in gaining attention to
events and promoting change. I note that, while focusing events are considered by many in the disaster studies field to be
major drivers of policy change in the United States disaster policy, most disasters have little effect on the overall doctrine
of shared responsibilities between the national and subnational governments.
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Resilience has come into vogue in the disaster research
field—and in governance in general—as a shorthand, in-
tuitively comprehensible term to describe the ideal sort
of community level response to disasters: that of “bounc-
ing back” or “rebounding” from a shock (Aguirre, 2007;
Comfort, 1994; Manyena, 2006). The term resilience, in
the disaster research setting, borrows from the concept
in ecology, in which we define a resilient ecosystem as
one that can absorb a short-term shock to the system,
and then can, in a reasonable span of time, return to the
state of the ecosystem before the shock.
The problem with terms like “resilience” is that they
become uncoupled from their intellectual and techni-
cal origins, and simply become catch-all terms or nos-
trums uttered by politicians, civil servants, and technical
experts, with little or no shared understanding of what
we mean. Still, the idea of resilience has considerable
promise as an organizing principle, because it lends it-
self to some relatively measurable aspects that we can
compare across communities from the local to the global
level. And if we can understand the basic components of
functionality, we can relate typical efforts to prepare for,
respond to, recover from, and mitigate disasters.
A group known as MCEER (formerly the Multidisci-
plinary Center for Earthquake Engineering Research) at
the University at Buffalo provided a simple but power-
ful conceptualization of resilience it called the resilience
delta (see, for example, materials in MCEER, 2016). In a
community, we can conceive of its resilience—and that
of its individual components—along twodimensions: the
size of the shock that the community or system with-
stands, and the speed at which the community returns
to the status quo ante. Figure 1 illustrates this idea. Con-
sider, for example, two communities, both of which are
exposed to the same “size” shock (say, the same size
earthquake or same degree of wind and water damage
from a coastal storm). These are indicated as lines A and
B.While both communities recover at the same rate, the
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Figure 1. The Resilience Delta.
extent of damage to community B is such that it takes
longer for that community to recover, even if their pace
of recovery is quicker.
Next, consider two communities that sustain differ-
ent levels of damage, communities C and D. Community
C receives more damage than does community D, yet re-
covers more quickly because that community has made
an investment in the things that communities need to
recover quickly from disasters, such as making recovery
plans or understanding the role of interdependent infras-
tructure systems and how they can promote recovery.
We can therefore see two dimensions of resilience: ef-
forts to reduce damage, which characterizes communi-
ties A and D, and a strategy to speed recovery, as exem-
plified by community C. We therefore might conceive of
making communities more resilient by adopting policies
that reduce the amount of damage that a community
withstands in the first place, and that put measures in
place to allow for rapid recovery of community functions
after a shock has occurred; this is exemplified by commu-
nity A in this diagram.
On this first dimension, communities such as Tulsa,
Oklahoma, or Grand Forks, North Dakota, in the United
States, have learned that leaving some land open and
undeveloped means less property is exposed to flood-
ing when it occurs. Similar measures have been under-
taken in coastal communities worldwide, which attempt
to, for example, retain natural features along the ocean,
such as mangrove forests, that better withstand dam-
age than would engineered disaster mitigation systems.
Of course, this resilience delta is an oversimplification;
in an actual community, there are multiple resilience
deltas that describe the shock to and recovery of multi-
ple systems, including water, power, transportation, ed-
ucation, health care, trade, industry and commerce, to
name a few. In many cases, these resilience deltas are in-
terdependent, because infrastructure is interdependent
(Barker & Haimes, 2009; Leavitt & Kiefer, 2006).
Additional features of the resilience delta deserve at-
tention. First, we know from the literature on disaster
recovery that slow recovery can mean that a commu-
nity fails to return to its original functionality. Managua,
Nicaragua, for example, did not function as well as a city
after the 1972 earthquake as it did before the quake, a
result of a corrupt national government that stole disas-
ter recovery resources to benefit its leaders (Birkland &
Warnement, 2014). But corruption is only an extreme ex-
ample of how slow efforts to recovery can cause com-
munity functionality to, over time, decline. On the other
hand, one can conceive of truly resilient disaster recov-
ery as including the ability of a community to rebound
and, as is often said, built back better than the commu-
nity was before. After a series of damaging earthquakes
in California from the 1930s to 1990s, public policy in
California was designed to improve the resilience of key
systems through improvements to building codes in gen-
eral, and with specific attention paid to schools, hospi-
tals, roads, and utility and other lifeline systems. When
“the big one” strikes California, it is likely to do substantial
damage, but these efforts will, to some extent, mitigate
the worst effects of large earthquakes, thereby improv-
ing community resilience (Birkland, 2006).
The policy tools used to improve resilience will vary
based on the nature of the community and the resources
available to it. But wemust not assume that poorer areas
of the world are, simply because of poverty, not resilient,
nor should we assume that richer communities are nec-
essarily more resilient.
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Most jurisdictions use a variety of tools to mitigate
disasters and to respond to them when they occur. In
the United States, the adoption and use of these tools
is primarily focused at the local level, either in local gov-
ernments (cities, counties, and the like) or the subna-
tional (state) governments. For simplicity’s sake, we can
broadly categorize such tools as informational, regula-
tory, and engineering. Informational tools include efforts
such as mapping floodplains and inundation zones, in-
forming people of what they can do to mitigate hazards
in their homes and communities, or engaging in public
information campaigns to inform people how to prepare
for disasters by stocking food, water, batteries for radios
and lights, and so on.More coercive regulatorymeasures
include building codes and land use planning regulation;
stringent building codes have proven their worth in re-
ducing damage from earthquakes, hurricanes, and tor-
nadoes. Land use tools involve prohibiting development
in hazardous areas, such as in floodplains or tsunami in-
undation areas. These tools, however, are often viewed
unfavorably by property owners, who would rather have
the freedom to use their property as they see fit. In-
deed, the pressure to develop land motivates communi-
ties to use engineered solutions to mitigate the harms
done by disasters. Examples include levees along rivers,
hardened shorelines and “beach nourishment” projects,
and flood control dams. In some cases, engineered solu-
tionsmake a communitymore robustly protected against
flooding, but, when such systems fail, as in New Or-
leans in Hurricane Katrina in 2005, these systems fail
catastrophically. The very land they “protect” is thereby
made more vulnerable to disaster and the community is
less resilient.
It is an article of faith in the literature about the
United States that sudden, attention-grabbing “focusing
events” drive changes in policy. One might assume that
such events—major disasters, in this case—would pro-
vide opportunities for policy makers and communities to
“learn” from disaster and to improve policy. But this does
not happen all the time. In the United States, the focus-
ing event of September 11 led to policy changes its emer-
gency management system that made the country less
resilient to natural disasters; these errors were only cor-
rected when Hurricane Katrina demonstrated the funda-
mental problems with the reorganization of the United
States national emergency management based on faulty
premises (Birkland, 2004).
Even then, while we can isolate individual examples
of “better” policy being enacted after disasters at the
sub national level, it is also the case that the fundamen-
tal organization of disaster management has not greatly
changed in the last forty years in the United States. The
major premises of emergency management and hazard
mitigation—that state and local governments are pri-
marily responsible for these efforts, with some financial
and technical support from the national government—
remain in place. This means that, in the United States,
disaster mitigation and preparedness is variable from
state to state, and from community to community within
each state. That said, there is some evidence that states
and local governments do learn from other states and
localities with similar hazards. For example, Florida has
long been considered a leader in hurricane prepared-
ness, while California is a world leader in earthquake pre-
paredness (Birkland, 2006). As communities in Washing-
ton state and Oregon have come to appreciate the earth-
quake hazard, they have begun to take lessons from Cal-
ifornia to mitigate and prepare for future earthquakes.
Developing countries also can learn from the expe-
rience of the developed world. The developing coun-
tries may not have the resources to invest in expen-
sive engineered systems to protect against floods and
storm surges. But developing countries can learn from,
for example, the City of New Orleans. Some scholars be-
lieved that New Orleans was characterized by low lev-
els of social capital, and therefore could not count on
community solidarity and social capital to recover from
the storm. This was not true (Hawkins & Maurer, 2010);
New Orleanians could harness local efforts to shape dis-
aster recovery and to parry some of the more impracti-
cal ideas of out of town “experts”. Similarly, efforts to
promote resilience in developing countries will likely be
much more successful if they are conceived as bottom-
up programs that are developed by local people, with
expert assistance as needed, to meet the needs of the
community. Well-meaning efforts to impose solutions
from outside the community are not likely to success-
ful. After the 2011 Haiti earthquake, most aid came from
international non-governmental organizations (INGOs)
that have largely provided things that have little to do
with building community resilience (Klarreich & Polman,
2012). Haiti has long been dependent on NGO and inter-
national development assistance (Booth, 2011; Klarreich
& Polman, 2012), even well before the earthquake, and
needs are largely assessed without popular participation.
This type of recovery is unlikely to succeed either as re-
covery or as means for promoting resilience.
Of course, it is simple to isolate the problems that
governments and communities must address, often with
limited time, few resources, and remarkable pressures to
promote recovery. This thematic issue will go a long way
to helping us to understand how developed and develop-
ing countries are similar and differ in their approaches to
disaster governance and resilience. We will learn about
how this governancemay be improved, with attention to
collaborative work among multiple stakeholders—from
the neighborhood level, to regional and national govern-
ments, to NGOs. The goal of such efforts should not be to
collaborate for its own sake—rather, these efforts need
to assess who should collaborate, and to what end. Po-
tential collaborators whose participation will not serve
to improve disaster resilience should be deemphasized
in favor of collaborators who have a demonstrated goal
and track record in promoting resilience. I hope that the
articles contained in this special issue move us toward
this goal.
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